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Urban water demand with ﬁxed volumetric 








This paper uses suburb-level quarterly data to model residential water demand in Brisbane,
Australia, from 1998 to 2003. In this system, residential consumption is charged using
a ﬁxed annual service fee with no water entitlement followed by a ﬁxed volumetric
charge per kilolitre. Water demand is speciﬁed as average quarterly household water
consumption and the demand characteristics include the marginal price of water,
household income and size, and the number of rainy and warm days. The ﬁndings not
only conﬁrm residential water as price and income inelastic, but also that the price
and income elasticity of demand in owner-occupied households is higher than in
rented households. The results also show that weather, particularly summer months








Water supply efﬁciency and demand management are increasingly important
issues for residential water supply authorities throughout the world. Population
growth, coupled with the reduction in freshwater supplies, has prompted
suppliers to place renewed emphasis on demand management through pricing
structures and other strategies. In the USA, for example, Ipe and Bhagwat
(2002) found that water sources in Chicago are reaching exhaustion, whereas
population and per capita water use is increasing. In Israel, Klawitter (2003)
concluded that the Tel Aviv water utility is economically unsustainable because
water is overconsumed as the price does not send appropriate welfare signals




. (2001) summarises the trend in most OECD
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(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) economies towards
metering, increasing block prices, and reduced subsidies for residential water
supply.
In Australia, too, there have been longstanding efforts to improve residential
water demand management. These have received renewed impetus with the
sustained drought in the eastern states and the critical level of water reservoirs
supplying large urban centres. As far back as 1994, 
 
The Strategic Framework
for the Efﬁcient and Sustainable Reform of the Australian Water Industry
 
 was
endorsed at the meeting of the Council of Australian Governments. This
framework required councils to introduce two-part tariffs for water pricing
(where cost-effective to do so), with fully transparent community subsidies
(if any) and the minimal free allocation of water. In practice, these two-part
tariff systems generally consist of a ﬁxed annual service or access charge,
with or without a ‘free’ water entitlement, and a volumetric component or
user-pays charge with a single block (ﬂat rate).
Clearly, the introduction of two-part tariffs throughout Australia may have
affected residential water consumption. In Tasmania, the Government Prices
Oversight Commission (2003a) suggested that a 15 per cent fall in consump-
tion could be anticipated following the introduction of two-part tariffs. In
Queensland, Marsden Jacob Associates (1997) provided anecdotal evidence
of a 20 per cent reduction in per capita consumption in the ﬁrst year of
implementing two-part tariffs. Work of a similar nature includes Independent
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) of New South Wales (2003), Essential
Services Commission of Victoria (2004) and Government Prices Oversight
Commission Tasmania (2003b). But apart from these, remarkably little
empirical effort has been directed at the modelling of residential water





Higgs and Worthington 2001).
The purpose of this paper is to address this imbalance. A key objective is to
provide estimates of the price and income elasticity of residential water demand.
These provide key inputs into optimal tariff design and demand-side manage-
ment strategies. For example, while economists generally agree that prices
are a way of reducing demand during periods of limited water supply, others
argue that water demand is price inelastic, and therefore an ineffective tool
for regulating consumption. Supporters of this viewpoint would perhaps
suggest that more appropriate mechanisms for regulating residential water con-
sumption are non-price strategies, encompassing public education campaigns,
rationing, water restrictions, and subsidisation of programs aimed at adopting
water-efﬁcient technologies.
The paper itself is organised as follows. The second section discusses the
environmental and institutional context of the empirical analysis. The third
section presents the model for estimation of water demand and the set of
independent variables included. A brief descriptive analysis is provided in
the fourth section. The ﬁfth section presents the results of the estimation.
The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks. 
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The information for the demand estimation is obtained from the Brisbane
City Council, Australia’s largest local government. Brisbane, the capital city





 with approximately 950 000 residents. The city has a subtropical




 south of the equator. Centred on the Brisbane
River, 15 km inland from the Paciﬁc Ocean, Brisbane has mild dry winters and









C and average daily rainfall is
2.69 mm. In line with high population growth in the rest of south-eastern
Queensland, the city has grown steadily since the mid-1990s, with population
increasing by 9.4 per cent and residential dwellings by 12.3 per cent. As a result,
the average household size, currently 2.57 persons, has fallen by 2.6 per cent.
Brisbane’s water was supplied under a ﬁxed-access charge until 1993. In 1995–
1996, water meters and optional volumetric pricing were ﬁrst introduced
(see Higgs and Worthington 2001 for an analysis of this policy change) with
two-part tariffs made compulsory in July 1997. Since then, all residential
consumption has been charged using a ﬁxed annual service fee with no
free entitlement and a ﬁxed (or ﬂat) volumetric charge per kilolitre. Over the
period 1997–1998 to 2003–2004, residential water has been billed quarterly

























A0.84 in 2003–2004. In
addition, the council has imposed outdoor water-use restrictions in the form
of alternate ﬁxed sprinkling days for more than 20 years, as well as a high
publicity ‘Water Wise’ education campaign. Brisbane, however, has generally
less severe water restrictions than other Australian state capitals. For example,
Sydney Water (responsible for the greater Sydney metropolitan, suburban, and
satellite area) has standing prohibitions on ﬁxed garden irrigation systems
and hosing of ‘hard surfaces’ (including cars, footpaths, paving, and buildings).
 
3. Demand estimation and model speciﬁcation
 
Water demand equations generally take a form where the quantity of water
demanded (more likely consumed) is expressed as a function of price, income,
and other demand factors. The speciﬁcation actually employed depends heavily
on the data available and whether these are available at the household level or
higher. Unfortunately, and in common with most previous studies of water





. 2003 for a useful survey of water demand estimation). Accordingly,
in this study, a suburb-level model is speciﬁed where the average quantity of
water consumed per household per quarter in each suburb is speciﬁed as the
dependent variable in a regression (expected sign of the estimated coefﬁcient
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) can be measured either at the household level via user metering or by
the main line meter at the water substation. If measurement is at the bulk
meter, system losses and other consumption such as industrial, commercial,
community, and rural use must be accounted for prior to estimation. The
Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines provided quarterly
residential water consumption data by suburb. The data comprise two
separate records: ‘Tariff 02’ records, which pertain to water supplied to all
residential premises rated as owner occupied, and ‘Tariff 70’ records, which
relate to water supplied to all residential premises rated as non-owner occupied
(tenanted or rented). Under the Queensland 
 
Residential Tenancies Act 1994
 
,
tenants are entitled to a free allocation of a ‘reasonable’ amount of water
by their landlords so it can be expected that renting households may be less
price-sensitive than owner-occupied households. Data for both renting and
owner-occupied households are collected quarterly from September 1998
to June 2003 and include the total number of bills and total billed water con-
sumption for each suburb. With this information in hand, average household
water consumption for owner-occupied and rental housing in the 53 Brisbane
suburbs is calculated for the sample period of 20 quarters. 





water in Brisbane. A key feature of demand-side management policies is
the pricing structure and a variety of alternative forms have been employed
in Australia and elsewhere (Dinar and Subramanian 1998; Bartoszczuk and
Nakamori 2004). These include (i) a ﬁxed charge invariant to the level of
consumption, (ii) a ﬁxed charge with a free allowance followed by some
excess charge for consumption over a particular level, (iii) a two-part tariff
consisting of a ﬁxed access charge, (iv) and a cost per unit based on the volume
of water consumed (as in Brisbane) or a cost per unit that varies when
consumption reaches certain thresholds, in such a way that the tariff consists
of sequence of marginal prices for different consumption blocks. In turn, block
prices can increase or decrease with each successive block of water use. 
Different pricing structures can complicate the calculation of a marginal
price, as reﬂected by the variation in pricing speciﬁcation in the literature.
For example, Nieswiadomy (1992) and García and Reynaud (2003) specify




 (1998) use the marginal
price less the difference between what the typical consumer actually pays for
water and what would be paid if all the water were purchased at the marginal




. (2001) includes the average
price, Pashardes and Hajispyrou (2002) specify the marginal price in the highest
tariff block, and Martínez-Espiñeira (2003) employs the average marginal
price. Fortunately, in Brisbane there is a single ﬁxed price per kilolitre with
no free water allowance at all levels of consumption. This means the price 
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speciﬁcation is relatively straightforward. Pricing information is provided
by the Brisbane City Council. This variable changes over time, but not across
suburbs.




) in each suburb.
In the case of water consumption, it is reasonable to assume that the current
period’s water use will be related to the previous period. Therefore, the inclu-
sion of the previous quarter’s consumption should capture any unobservable
determinants, including past changes in water-saving behaviour and technology.
By including a lagged term for consumption, the model is effectively estimating




. 1997). The third independent





is that water consumption, as a normal good, should be positively related to
income. This is especially so as income is also positively related to many water-
using goods, including swimming pools, in-ground irrigation systems, and
dishwashing machines. A second consideration is that income, through its
positive relationship with education, may be reﬂective of water conservation
measures taken by the household through the purchase of water-conserving
appliances and planting of drought-tolerant gardens. A negative coefﬁcient
would then be hypothesised. Regardless, most studies have found that the
income elasticity of demand is in fact positive (Agthe and Billings 1987;





The data on household income are sourced from the Australian Taxation Ofﬁce,
which provides mean incomes by post-code area (corresponding roughly
to suburbs). Although there is inevitably some bias with this information –
individuals without group certiﬁcates are not obliged to lodge returns,
taxable income is less than total income because of tax deductions, etc. – it is
generally acceptable. This variable changes over time and across suburbs. 





). The basic argument is water consumption is positively related to the




. (2000) found that water use
is less than proportional to the increase in household size or population
because of economies of scale in discretionary and non-discretionary water
usage, including cooking, cleaning, car washing, and gardening. Höglund (1999)
also found that if the average number of persons per household increases
from two to three in a community, demand for water per person declines by
some 27–35 per cent. The average size of households is taken from the
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001 Census. This information is grouped by
Statistical Local Area, which again corresponds roughly to suburbs. As a result,
the household size variable is ﬁxed over time but varies by suburb.
The next three independent variables are weather-related factors. These have
been shown to affect residential water use in a number of ways. The amount
of rainfall, for example, has an inﬂuence on garden watering, and also on
other activities such as washing cars, laundry, and topping-up swimming
pools. Temperature has also been shown to inﬂuence water consumption,
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watering and topping-up of swimming pools. Daily weather information is
sourced from the Australian Bureau of Meteorology. To include weather and
temperature factors, variables are speciﬁed for the number of rainy days in




) and the number of warm
days in each quarter (those with a daily maximum in the uppermost quartile




). For warm days, the effective cut-off is tem-




C. The ﬁnal variable speciﬁed takes a value of 1




). All weather variables are ﬁxed across suburbs,
but vary over time.
The estimation of the urban demand equations for water in Brisbane
comprises two forms: a linear and a non-linear (or log–log) model. Billings and
Agthe (1980) and Miaou (1990) also speciﬁed linear and log–log models, whereas
Foster and Beattie (1981) and Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) employed a
log–log transformation. These functional forms are applied to three separate






























































































































































2LnLAGt + β3LnINCt + β4LnSZEt 
+ β5LnRNYt + β6LnWRMt + β7SUMt (2)
where t is the time period and all other variables are as previously deﬁned.
For the linear model, the short-run elasticities are calculated at the means, with
the exception of the lagged demand term. The lagged demand coefﬁcient is
used to determine the long-run price elasticity of demand of α1/(1 – α2) at the
mean. The short-run elasticity for the log–log model is simply the value of the
estimated coefﬁcient with the long-run price elasticity of demand as β1/(1 – β2). 
4. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents a summary of descriptive statistics across the 53 Bris-
bane suburbs from September 1998 to June 2003. Sample means, maximums,
minimums, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis are reported. Also
included are decompositions of these variables into their mean, seasonal, and
time-series components. As shown, household quarterly water consumption
averaged 73.11 kL with owner-occupied households averaging 75.36 kL and
renter households averaging 65.45 kL. There is clearly a strong seasonal
component with household water consumption being 17.91 kL higher in the
December quarter and 4.49 kL lower in the June quarter. Consumption per
quarter has also trended upwards over the entire sample period by 0.58 kL


























































































































































Central tendency and distribution
Mean 73.11 75.36 65.45 0.76 12 495.35 33.70 22.65
SD 21.46 22.41 18.68 0.05 3 241.51   9.98 21.84
Minimum 23.31 7.75 13.75 0.70 7 531.14   15.00 0.00
Maximum 211.91 214.47 302.36 0.82 24 992.42   51.00 72.00
Kurtosis 9.91 9.35 33.50 1.21  4.36   2.28 2.34
Skewness 1.99 1.83 3.70 –0.35  1.17   –0.40 0.67
Seasonal and time decomposition
Intercept 67.06 68.36 61.79 0.68 11 191.00   41.50 37.89
Time trend 0.58 0.67 0.35 0.01   124.00 –0.74 0.32
March quarter 2.90 3.57 1.72 0.09 1 379.00 –2.70 9.80
June quarter –4.49 –4.23 –4.46 0.09 1 528.00  –4.90 –38.55
September quarter 7.88 9.22 3.94 0.09 1 081.00  –15.70 –14.31
December quarter 17.91 19.41 13.44 0.09 1 230.00   –7.90 0.32
SD, standard deviation.354 Hoffmann et al.
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households. Across all suburbs and quarters, the marginal water price
averages 76 cents per kL, the average household income is #A12 495 and
the number of rainy and warm days per quarter are 34 days (37 per cent) and
23 days (25 per cent), respectively. Of course, there is a wide seasonal variation
in these variables, with fewer rainy days in the September quarter and more in
the March quarter, and more warm days in the March quarter and fewer in
the June quarter.
5. Empirical results
Table 2 provides the estimated coefﬁcients, standard errors and P-values of
the null hypotheses that the individual coefﬁcients are equal to zero and the
short- and long-run elasticities (at the means) of the parameters detailed in
Equation (1). As the cross-sections (i.e., suburbs) are drawn from a small
geographical region with many socioeconomic commonalities (i.e., Brisbane),
cross-sectional variation in demand is likely to be small and identiﬁers for
each suburb are regarded as unnecessary: a common effects panel data model
is used. The results of six separate regressions are presented. The upper panel
includes the estimated results of a linear form and the lower panel a non-
linear form with log–log transformation. The three sets of estimated results
for the linear and non-linear forms are for all households, owner-occupied
household, and rental households, respectively.
Also included in Table 2 are statistics for R
2 and adjusted R
2 and F-statistics
and P-values for joint hypothesis tests that all slope coefﬁcients are zero. The
R
2 for the linear models include Gujarati’s (2003, p. 221) adjustment to allow
direct comparison with the R
2 from the log–log models. Typically for panel data,
the R
2 of all six regressions have relatively high explanatory power, ranging from
0.648 to 0.704 for the linear models and 0.698 and 0.776 for the non-linear
models. To test for multicolinearity, variance inﬂation factors (VIF) are calculated
(not shown). As a rule of thumb, a VIF greater than 10 indicates the presence of
harmful colinearity. Among the independent variables, the highest VIFs are
for lagged demand (3.002), rainy days (2.016), and household income (2.089).
This suggests that multicolinearity, although present, will not bias the estimated
coefﬁcients. In terms of the residuals, White’s chi-squared test of the null hypothesis
of homoskedasticity is rejected (Chi-squared statistic = 203.827, P = 0.000), so
the standard errors and P-values in Table 2 all incorporate White’s corrections
for heteroskedasticity of an unknown form.
The models ﬁrst discussed are those employing a linear speciﬁcation. For
all households, the estimated coefﬁcients for all parameters are signiﬁcant at
the 1 per cent level of signiﬁcance or lower and conform to a priori expectations.
Using the F-statistic the null hypothesis that all slope coefﬁcients are jointly zero
is also rejected at the 1 per cent level. The largest effects on water consumption
are clearly the water price and lagged demand. The short-run price elasticity
of demand at the mean is –0.588 (inelastic) indicating that a 10 per cent











































































































































Table 2 Estimated linear and non-linear regression models
Variable
All households Owner-occupied households Renter households
Coefﬁcient SE P-value Elasticity Coefﬁcient SE P-value Elasticity Coefﬁcient SE P-value Elasticity
Linear demand equation
Constant 50.469 8.546 0.000 – 56.542 6.786 0.000 – 24.313 18.211 0.182 –
Water price (#A/kL) –56.256 8.537 0.000 –0.588 –59.888 7.377 0.000 –0.607 –34.165 16.278 0.036 –0.399
Lagged demand (kL) 0.592 0.059 0.000 –1.442 0.616 0.055 0.000 –1.579 0.393 0.144 0.006 –0.658
Household income (#A) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.239 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.234 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.276
Household size (n) 6.129 1.540 0.000 0.212 5.030 1.317 0.000 0.169 10.685 3.457 0.002 0.414
Rainy days (n)– 0.567 0.046 0.000 –0.259 –0.617 0.046 0.000 –0.273 –0.348 0.063 0.000 –0.177
Warm days (n) 0.031 0.019 0.106 0.009 0.022 0.019 0.264 0.006 0.089 0.034 0.009 0.030
Summer 15.751 0.713 0.000 – 16.574 0.745 0.000 – 12.493 0.884 0.000 –
R
2 0.745 – – – 0.703 – – – 0.648 – – –
Adjusted R
2 0.744 – – – 0.703 – – – 0.647 – – –
F-statistic 451.889 – 0.000 – 479.039 – 0.000 – 200.718 – 0.000 –
Non-linear demand equation
Constant –0.077 0.183 0.676 – –0.258 0.226 0.254 – 0.310 0.178 0.083 –
Water price (#A/kL) –0.507 0.073 0.000 –0.507 –0.455 0.084 0.000 –0.455 –0.391 0.099 0.000 –0.391
Lagged demand (kL) 0.566 0.048 0.000 –1.167 0.486 0.083 0.000 –0.884 0.502 0.078 0.000 –0.785
Household income (#A) 0.235 0.029 0.000 0.235 0.298 0.048 0.000 0.298 0.191 0.033 0.000 0.191
Household size (n) 0.211 0.046 0.000 0.211 0.210 0.053 0.000 0.210 0.327 0.074 0.000 0.327
Rainy days (n)– 0.218 0.014 0.000 –0.218 –0.234 0.019 0.000 –0.234 –0.168 0.017 0.000 –0.168
Warm days (n) 0.020 0.004 0.000 0.020 0.027 0.006 0.000 0.027 0.025 0.005 0.000 0.025
Summer 0.197 0.010 0.000 – 0.193 0.013 0.000 – 0.166 0.011 0.000 –
R
2 0.776 – – – 0.720 – – – 0.698 – – –
Adjusted R
2 0.775 – – – 0.718 – – – 0.696 – – –
F-statistic 494.829 – 0.000 – 366.181 – 0.000 – 329.254 – 0.000 –
SE, standard error; —, not applicable.356 Hoffmann et al.
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quantity demanded in the short run. Long-run price elasticity at the means
of –1.442 suggests a 10 per cent increase in price will reduce consumption by
14.42 per cent implying the price elasticity of demand is more elastic in the long
run than in the short run. The income elasticity of 0.239 (inelastic) indicates
that a 10 per cent increase in income is associated with a 2.39 per cent increase in
the quantity of water demanded. By way of comparison, Agthe and Billings
(1987) calculated a price elasticity of –0.56 and an income elasticity of 0.46,
Barkatullah (1996) –0.21 and 0.07, Dandy et al. (1997) –0.78 and 0.38, García
and Renaud (2003) –0.25 and 0.00, and Gaudin et al. (2001) –0.47 and 0.19.
The impact on water demand of changes in the number of rainy and warm
days are signiﬁcantly negative and positive, respectively. The elasticities
indicate that a 10 per cent increase in rainy days is associated with a 2.59 per
cent fall in water consumption for the quarter; whereas a 10 per cent increase
in warm days is associated with a 0.01 per cent increase in water consumption
for the quarter. There is broad agreement between the separate regressions
for owner-occupied and rental households, with the exception that for owner-
occupied households the price elasticity is higher (–0.607 compared to –0.399)
and income elasticity is lower (0.234 compared to 0.276).
The lower panel in Table 2 presented the estimated coefﬁcients, standard
errors and P-values of the null hypothesis that the individual parameters are
equal to zero and the short- and long-run elasticities for the non-linear
models. On the basis of R
2 the non-linear models are preferred, accounting
for up to 78 per cent of the variation in the quantity of water demanded. All
of the estimated coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level of signiﬁcance
and conform to a priori expectations. The short-run price elasticity of demand
across all households is –0.507 indicating that a 10 per cent increase in the
price of water is associated with a 5.07 per cent decrease in the quantity of
water demanded, whereas the long-run price elasticity of demand is –1.167
suggesting a 10 per cent increase in price is associated with an 11.67 per cent
decrease in the quantity of water demanded. The long-run price elasticity of
demand is again more elastic than the short-run. The income elasticity of
demand of 0.235 suggests that a 10 per cent increase in income is associated
with a 2.35 per cent increase in the quantity of water demanded. 
The price and income elasticities of demand are again lower for renter
households when compared to that of owner-occupied households. The
difference in price elasticity between owner-occupied and renter households
is unsurprising. Under the Queensland Residential Tenancies Act 1994, tenants
are entitled to a free allocation of a ‘reasonable’ amount of water by their
landlords, after which negotiations are necessary to resolve payment. In
practice, the benchmark for reasonableness set by the Brisbane City Council
is 90 kL per quarter, well above the average household consumption. As the
transaction and enforcement costs of negotiation is likely to be large relative
to the beneﬁts (the variable component of water bills for rental households in the
sample averaged just #A49.74), the potential reimbursement of ‘unreasonable’
water expense is unlikely.Urban water demand in Brisbane, Australia 357
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6. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations
The present study uses linear and non-linear regression techniques to model
household residential water demand. The data are drawn from the Brisbane
City Council, Australia’s largest local government area, where two-part tariffs
consisting of a ﬁxed access charge with no free entitlement of water and a
constant volumetric charge per kilolitre are in place. As far as the authors are
aware, this is the ﬁrst attempt to derive formal models of household water
demand in Queensland, and one of few conducted in Australia. This represents
a sizeable advance over projects of a similar nature conducted in Australia,
including IPART (2003), Essential Services Commission of Victoria (2004),
and Government Prices Oversight Commission Tasmania (2003a,b), which have
tended to rely on relatively simple comparisons between changes in water-
pricing structures and changes in water consumption to formulate policy. 
The most important ﬁnding is that the short-run price elasticity of demand,
although inelastic, is larger than previously thought. The price elasticity of
demand is also more elastic in the long run than in the short run. This
implies that the price mechanism can be an effective tool for managing the
demand and consumption of residential water. It also suggests that there is
a lag between changes in water prices and their eventual impact on the quantity
demanded. Depending upon the model speciﬁed, a 10 per cent increase in the
price of water is associated with a reduction in the quantity demanded of
about 5 per cent. In other terms, a price rise of just #0.08 per kilolitre would
have prevented Brisbane household water consumption trending upwards by
580 L per household over the period 1998–2003. This would amount to water
saving of 789 000 kL per year across Brisbane. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to comment on the effectiveness of price
relative to non-price controls, including public education campaigns and water
restrictions, as most programs of this type had been in place and unchanged
during the period under consideration. However, evidence elsewhere suggests
that constraints placed on discretionary water use (gardening, car washing,
ﬁlling/topping up of swimming pools) can have an equal, if not more sizeable,
impact on water demand. In the current analysis, the number of rainy days
has a major impact on residential water demand through discretionary
consumption (i.e., garden irrigation) and this implies that restrictions on
irrigation and outside use are likely to be effective demand management
strategies. A second ﬁnding is that the price elasticity of demand is lower for
renter households than owner-occupied households. One likely reason is that
under current tenancy legislation renter households in Queensland are only
obliged to pay for ‘excess’ water usage and this obscures, contrary to all economic
principles regarding pricing transparency, the marginal cost of water consump-
tion in these households. This is a clear omission in the legislation. 
The ﬁnal ﬁnding is that factors beyond the control of water authorities also
have an inﬂuence on residential water demand. That is, there is a signiﬁcant
increase in water demand in summer months, this is only partially moderated358 Hoffmann et al.
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by a fall on rainy days, and made worse with a rise on warm days. When
combined with strong population growth and the continuing fall in average
household size in south-eastern Queensland, the (in-sample) trending upwards
of warm days (by 1 day per quarter every 16 years) and downwards in rainy days
(by 1 day per quarter every 3 years) suggests that residential water demand
in Brisbane will continue to grow. This highlights the need for efﬁcient and
effective demand-side management strategies in conjunction with improvements
in water-related infrastructure. 
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